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Robust (cross-border) interbank markets are important for the well functioning of modern financial 
systems. Yet, a network of interbank exposures may lead to domino effects following the event of 
an initial bank failure. The “structure” of the interbank market is a potential important driving 
factor in the risk and impact of interbank contagion. We investigate the evolution of contagion risk 
for the Belgian banking system over the period 1993-2002 using detailed information on aggregate 
interbank exposures of individual banks and on large bilateral interbank exposures. We find that a 
change from a complete structure (where all banks have symmetric links) towards a “multiple 
money centre” structure (where the money centres are symmetrically linked to some banks, which 
are themselves not linked together) as well as a more concentrated banking market have decreased 
the risk and impact of contagion. Moreover, an increase in the proportion of cross-border interbank 
assets has lowered the risk and impact of local contagion.  Yet, this reduction was probably 
accompanied by an increase in contagion risk generated by foreign banks, although even here the 
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Events like the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and Russia’s default on its sovereign bonds 
leading to the near collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, have rekindled interest in 
the functioning of interbank markets (for an early analysis, see Mc Andrews and Potter (2002) and 
Furfine (2002), respectively). Market participants have an interest in a well functioning and robust 
interbank market. Central banks use the interbank market to implement the interest rate reflecting 
the stance of monetary policy. Moreover, at the micro-economic level, financial institutions 
reallocate liquidity through interbank markets from institutions with a cash surplus to those with a 
cash deficit. At the macro-economic level, interbank markets strengthen financial integration but 
they also increase linkages and common exposures to risks within the banking s ector. As a 
consequence, these markets represent an important channel of contagion through which problems 
affecting one bank or one country may spread to other banks or other countries.  
 
This paper empirically addresses the implications of domestic and cross-border interbank linkages 
for financial stability. The main objective is to evaluate the risk that a chain reaction in the 
interbank market - i.e., a situation where the failure of one bank would lead to the default of one or 
more of its interbank creditors  - could create wider systemic risk.  Furthermore, we want to 
investigate the relevance of the interbank market structure for interbank contagion risk.  
 
Our empirical analysis considers the stability of the Belgian financial system. The Belgian financial 
system is an interesting case.  Indeed, t he Belgian interbank market1 is very international and 
Belgian banks underwent a period of consolidation in the years 1998-2001. Moreover, the structure 
of the Belgian interbank market has changed over time: it has moved from a “complete” structure 
(where all banks have symmetric links) towards a “multiple money centres” structure (where the 
centres are symmetrically linked to some banks without these banks being linked together). These 
observations raise several  interesting questions, which are also relevant for the analysis of the 
stability of financial systems in other countries. How have consolidation and internationalisation 
affected the interbank market? How important is the actual interbank market structure in explaining 
interbank contagion risk? To what extent could the failure of banks in another European country 
affect Belgian banks through cross-border interbank exposures? How has interbank contagion risk 
evolved over time? How does the assessment of contagion risk in Belgium compare with 
assessments in other countries? 
 
                                                 
1 By Belgian interbank market, we refer here to the set of interbank exposures where at least one of the counterparts is a 
bank incorporated in Belgium. 3. 
Understanding the potential consequences of the failure of one bank (foreign or domestic) might 
have on other domestic banks is an important aspect of financial stability2. We undertake a stylised, 
mechanical exercise - resembling a stress test - to examine the potential for interbank contagion to 
occur in Belgium. Namely, we simulate the consequences of non-repayment of interbank loans of a 
given bank on the capital of its bank lenders (and any further domino-like effects from the latter 
banks). In order to isolate contagion from other sources of distress such as macro-economic shocks, 
we assume that the initial default is caused by a sudden, unexpected and idiosyncratic shock. 
Simulations  are  based on an estimated matrix of bilateral exposures. We assume  that no 
adjustments have been made in interbank exposures to the failing banks. This assumption implies 
clear limitations; for example, it rules out preventive measures that might be taken by regulators or 
individual banks, such as timely reduction of exposures to the failing bank. More generally, the 
assumption excludes any behavioural changes (which could also include bank panics) arising from 
market expectations about failing banks. We will address these issues in a sensitivity analysis. 
  
In the analysis below we distinguish between potential contagion risk initiated by the failure of a 
Belgian bank versus potential contagion risk from abroad, i.e. implied by the failure of a foreign 
bank. The increase in international financial integration implies a shift towards a continued reliance 
on cross-border interbank flows. The question of potential contagion risk from abroad therefore 
deserves an in-depth analysis. We also investigate how the risk of contagion associated with the 
failure of a Belgian bank has evolved over time. In addition, we test the sensitivity of our results to 
several values of Loss Given Default ("LGD"), which allows us to partially take into account the 
moderation of interbank contagion risk arising from the increasing use of risk mitigation 
techniques, such as collateralised interbank loans or repurchase agreements (repos). 
 
Our empirical analysis shows that the risk of contagion due to domestic interbank defaults has 
decreased over the past decade and is currently very low. For example, for a LGD of 100% and in 
the worst-case scenario,  banks representing less than five percent of total balance sheet assets – 
excluding the assets of the first-domino – would be affected by contagion. We also  investigate 
whether contagion risk hinges upon the structure of the interbank market. Our results reveal that the 
interbank market structure is important in explaining  our contagion measures over time. In 
particular, we find that both a move from a complete structure towards a “multiple money centres” 
structure  and a more concentrated banking market decrease the risk and impact of contagion. 
Moreover, an  increase in the proportion of cross-border interbank assets decreases the risk and 
impact of local contagion. This, however, suggests that the potential contagion risk stemming from 
foreign interbank exposures3 has gained importance. According to o ur simulations, the failure of 
                                                 
2 Especially as banking crises and bank failures may take place. Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) offer an overview of 
the impact of recent banking crises. 
3 Interbank exposures between Belgian banks have dropped from 30 percent in 1993 to only 15 percent in 2002 of total 
Belgian interbank exposures. 4. 
some foreign banks could have a sizeable effect on Belgian banks' assets. However, the foreign 
banks whose interbank defaults have significant effects in our simulations are all internationally 
recognised and have high investment grade ratings. Thus, in reality, these banks are unlikely to 
default. Moreover, our simulations indicate that cross-border interbank defaults have a major effect 
on the Belgian financial system only for high values of LGDs. Belgian banks currently maintain 
relatively high proportions of secured interbank exposures, which tend to lower LGDs.  
 
Our simulations add to the literature studying contagion following from a network of interbank 
linkages in three respects. First, we show that a crucial explanatory factor of interbank contagion 
risk is the interbank market structure. To our knowledge, it is the first paper that tests for the impact 
of market structure on contagion risk. Second, we point out that it is important to take the time-
variation of interbank exposures into account. Third, we analyse the importance of international 
financial integration by looking at the source of an initial failure, i.e. domestic versus international.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of the link 
between interbank markets and contagion risk. Section 3 introduces the data set and highlights the 
important features of the Belgian interbank market that might have a bearing on contagion risk. 
Section 4 presents and discusses the results of the simulation exercise as well as the regression 
results of the impact of the (inter)bank market structure on our contagion measures. In section 5, 
we report additional sensitivity tests. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Contagion risk 
 
Contagion on interbank markets can occur in at least three types of situations: (i) when aggregate 
liquidity is insufficient, (ii) when market expectations create spillover effects and (iii) when the 
collapse of a bank induces a domino effect. We successively examine these three situations in more 
detail. 
 
In the aggregate, the interbank market only redistributes liquidity across banks; it does not create 
liquidity. A lack of aggregate liquidity could occur, for instance, if banks have excessive 
confidence in the ability of interbank markets to absorb transitory liquidity shocks, so that they 
under-invest in liquid assets (Bhattacharya and Gale (1987)).4 Interbank exposures may create 
problems if aggregate liquidity provision is insufficient. In this case, banks try to avoid liquidation 
of their long-term assets, and therefore liquidate their claims on other banks (possibly in other 
regions). A financial crisis in one region could then spread by contagion to other regions and 
                                                 
4 In practice, however, central banks play a key role in preventing liquidity shortages. See also subsection 2.2.3. 5. 
thereby introduce liquidity problems in the latter (Allen and Gale (2000)). Without the 
interlinkages between banks operating in different regions, the financial crisis would not spread 
between regions. 
 
 “Spillovers” through market expectations represent a second potential channel for contagion. For 
example, bank runs may occur when depositors observe other customers withdrawing their funds 
from the bank. The depositors not facing liquidity shocks may then decide to withdraw too, in the 
fear that they will ultimately be unable to recover their deposits (especially if banks must begin 
liquidating illiquid long-term assets in order to meet the high liquidity demand). These beliefs then 
become self-fulfilling (see Diamond and Dybvig (1983)) 5. Other forms of market spillover include 
withdrawals by depositors from (or unwillingness by other banks to provide liquidity to) a bank 
engaging in similar activities as those of a failing bank. Financial contagion may also occur across 
bank types. For example, the failure of a bank investing in certain assets may cause investors to 
infer that “similar” banks will get into trouble. O f course, regulatory intervention such as 
suspension of convertibility or deposit insurance may alleviate the problem of bank runs and 
banking panics (for an overview see Freixas and Rochet (1997)). 
 
A third source of contagion is the domino effect itself. The failure of one individual bank may 
initiate a domino effect if the non-repayment of interbank obligations by the failing bank 
jeopardises the ability of its creditor banks to meet their obligations to their (interbank) creditors.  
Contagion occurs then “mechanically” through the direct interlinkages between banks. Domino 
effects may arise across regions or bank types. This paper focuses on this specific source of 
contagion. 
 
2.2. Factors influencing the level of contagion risk 
 
The extent to which a crisis could propagate depends on several institutional features. We provide 
examples of this at three levels: (i) the bank level, (ii) the interbank market level, and (iii) the 
authority/supervisory level. 
 
2.2.1. The bank level 
 
Risk mitigation techniques, such as collateralised interbank loans (e.g. repos) reduce the risks of 
contagion.  The existence of a repo market may lead, however, to the disappearance of the 
uninsured international interbank market (Freixas and Holthausen (2001)). This can occur as a 
result of asymmetric information; a bank that attempts to obtain an unsecured cross-border loan 
                                                 
5 Bank runs may also occur in the interbank market when banks withdraw their interbank deposits following to other 
withdrawals.  6. 
may be suspected of having had the loan denied by other domestic banks which have more 
information about the borrower. Netting agreements  between banks –  i.e. a greements to take 
account of net exposures  only  –  are another institutional feature at the bank level to control 
interbank exposures. A problem at one bank is then less likely to initiate a “domino effect” on the 
interbank market. Emmons (1995), however, shows that netting of interbank claims shifts the bank 
default risk away from interbank claimants towards non-bank creditors, i.e. the risk is transferred to 
the banks’ creditors who are not included in the netting agreement.   
 
2.2.2. The interbank market level 
 
A first important factor determining the degree of contagion is the structure of interbank linkages. 
This structure can take different forms. Allen and Gale (2000) distinguish three interbank market 
structures: the complete structure where banks are symmetrically linked to all other banks of the 
system, the incomplete market structure where banks are only linked to neighbouring banks, and 
the disconnected incomplete market structure where two disconnected markets coexist. They show 
that complete structures are less prone to contagion than incomplete market structures, since with 
complete structures, the impact of a financial crisis in one region is absorbed by a large number of 
regions. Freixas et al. (2000) distinguish a fourth structure: the money centre. In this structure, the 
money centre is symmetrically linked to other banks of the system, which are themselves not linked 
together. They show that, in some cases, the failure of a bank linked to the money centre will not 
trigger the failure of the money centre, but the failure of the money centre itself may trigger failures 
of the linked banks. Figure 1 presents examples of matrices of bilateral exposures6 representing a 
simplified 4-bank system and summarises one potential outcome for each of the four characterised 
structures. In the complete market structure, each cell of the matrix of bilateral exposures (except 
the diagonal) should be positive. In the incomplete structure, the matrix of bilateral exposures 
should be filled with zeros except positions between neighbouring banks. In a matrix representing a 
disconnected structure, the cells reporting the positions between two banks belonging to two 
different markets, as well as the diagonal, should be equal to zero. Finally, the matrix of bilateral 
exposures of a money centre should be filled with zeros except the column and the row of the bank 
at the centre. 
 
A second factor at the interbank market level, however linked to the previous one, is banking 
market concentration. Economic theory does not provide an unambiguous response to the question 
of the impact of increasing concentration in banking markets on the stability of interbank markets, 
although some authors do find that such a trade-off exists in certain circumstances.7  
                                                 
6 The matrix of bilateral exposures summarises all the interbank loans (rows) and deposits (columns) existing between 
the banks of the system. 
7 For an overview of these issues see e.g. Carletti and Hartmann (2002). Carletti et al. (2002) examine the effects of bank 
mergers on reserve management and on interbank market liquidity. They argue that the probability of the banking system 7. 
 
2.2.3. The regulatory / supervisory level  
 
Several regulatory initiatives have been taken to decrease the risk of (cross-border) financial 
contagion. For instance, limits to large exposures imposed by authorities on banks8 contribute to 
reducing contagion risk. The use of cross-border financial collateral in the European Union has 
been facilitated by the Financial Collateral Directive, adopted by the European Parliament and the 
Council  in 2002.9 Banking supervisory authorities and the central banks of the European Union 
have furthermore recently agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding on high-level principles of 
co-operation in crisis management situations.10  
 
Potential central bank intervention, as well as the presence of safety nets, also lowers contagion 
risk. Central banks may decide to provide liquidity to the market as a whole when aggregate 
liquidity is insufficient, or directly to individual banks when the market fails to provide liquidity to 
sound financial institutions. Moreover, although interbank exposures are not explicitly covered by 
deposit insurance, issues such as “too-big-to-fail” may introduce implicit deposit insurance for 
these exposures.  
 
2.3. Empirical evidence 
 
Two empirical approaches are implemented to measure contagion, each having their strengths and 
weaknesses. A first approach tries to isolate contagion from other shocks affecting the economy. 
Therefore, it simulates the consequences of an individual bank failure given observed or estimated 
interbank exposures and looks at the potential domino effects, i.e. first round and potential further 
round effects. This is the approach we take in this paper. Sheldon and Maurer (1998) follow this 
                                                                                                                                                    
experiencing a liquidity shortage following a merger hinges on several factors, including the cost of refinancing on the 
interbank market relative to the cost of raising deposits and the structure of the post-merger liquidity shocks to banks. 
Allen and Gale (2003) show that contagion is less likely to occur in imperfect competition than in a perfectly competitive 
interbank market. However, concentration increases the probability of a “too-big-to-fail” type of intervention in a crisis, 
which may stimulate ex ante risk-taking behaviour on the part of large banks and increase the impact of a crisis. 
Moreover, in the absence of a too-big-to-fail type of intervention, the severity of contagion may be reinforced by a high 
degree of concentration. 
8  See e.g. Directive 2000/12/CE of the European Parliament and the Council relating to the taking up and the pursuit of 
the business of credit institutions for financial institutions incorporated in Europe and earlier the Directive 92/121/EEC 
on the monitoring and control of large exposures of credit institutions.  Limits are formulated in terms of banks' own 
funds. The EU Directive states that a bank's maximum exposure to a single counterparty may not exceed 25 % of 
regulatory own funds, and the cumulative amount of individual exposures exceeding 10 % of regulatory own funds may 
not exceed 800 % of those own funds. The Directive, however, allows for some exceptions. 
9 Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 June 2002 on Financial Collateral 
Arrangements. The directive aims at encouraging the cross-border use of financial collateral, mainly by eliminating legal 
uncertainty concerning the use of collateral and by providing a uniform regime for banks with regard to the taking of 
financial collateral. This could further stimulate the cross-border integration of interbank markets. See e.g. National Bank 
of Belgium (2002) 
10 See ECB Press Release, 10 March 2003. With the adoption of this memorandum, the authorities have expressed their 
commitment to co-operate to ensure the stability of the financial system at the EU level. This agreement enhances the 
practical arrangements for handling banking crises in order to facilitate an early assessment of the systemic risk of a 
crisis. 8. 
approach to study the issue of systemic risk in the Swiss interbank market. They conclude that the 
potential of contagion arising from interbank linkages in Switzerland is quite low although the 
failure of a large Swiss bank would have serious implications.  The results of Upper and Worms 
(2002), using this technique for the German  interbank market, suggest that contagion risk in 
Germany is not always confined to a limited number of small banks. Indeed, they conclude that a 
bank failure can trigger contagion in a sizeable part of the German banking system, although safety 
nets considerably reduce this risk. In a similar study for the UK, Wells (2002) finds that contagion 
would only occur following the failure of some large UK banks, which generally have a high credit 
rating. Finally, Furfine (2003), using data on bilateral exposures stemming from overnight U.S. 
federal funds transactions, finds that multiple rounds of failures are unlikely, and that aggregate 
assets at failing banks never exceed 1% of total assets of the commercial banks. 
 
A second approach to estimate contagion risk takes account of a larger variety of shocks. For 
instance, Elsingher et al. (2002)  simulate the impact of both credit risks and market risks on 
interbank payment flows. Thus credit risks and market risks influence both interbank flows and the 
value of bank capital. The net value of banks resulting from non-interbank activities in a particular 
state of the world (determined by interest rate, exchange rate, stock market and business cycle 
shocks) determines then the feasibility of interbank payments. Elsingher et al. (2002) distinguish 
between fundamental (directly caused by a shock) and contagious insolvency of Austrian banks. 
Their simulations indicate that in Austria, 97 % of insolvencies may be classified as fundamental 
whereas only the remaining 3 % are due to contagion. Lehar (2003) looks at correlations between 
bank portfolios. He estimates these correlations and uses them to compute different measures of 
systemic risk.  Gropp and Vesala (2003) use the tail properties of distance to default to study 
contagion risk. They find the presence of both domestic and cross-border contagion within Europe, 
although domestic seem to prevail over cross-border. The advantage of this second approach is that 
it allows for heterogeneity in individual bank’s failure probabilities and takes into account a system 
wide view. However, as we want to focus on systemic risk and perform a stress test, starting from 
an individual failure may yield more insights in the evolution of contagion risk over time, in the 
propagation mechanism and ultimate consequences of systemic risk. In addition, some of these 
techniques use market data but time-series of market data for Belgian banks are limited. Indeed, 
few Belgian banks are listed and the listed banks underwent merger processes. 
 
 
3. Description of the data 
 
 
The data used in this paper come from a confidential database (Schéma A) containing banks' 
balance-sheet statements and a set of financial information collected for prudential supervision 
purpose. This database provides valuable information with respect to interbank positions:  
 9. 
•  at an aggregate level, each bank reports monthly its total interbank loans and deposits and 
provides breakdowns of these “aggregate positions” according to the type of loan or 
deposit, the geographical origin of the lender or the borrower11 and the residual maturity of 
interbank loans or deposits. The aggregate positions used in this paper cover a period 
ranging from December 1992 to December 2002.  
 
•  at an individual bank level, banks report their “large exposures”12 to single obligors, 
including their interbank exposures.  Time-series of large exposures are however not 
available.13 We use a cross section of data on large exposures for December 2002.14  
 
Except where otherwise stated, figures are reported on a company basis, i.e. they include banks 
incorporated in Belgium (i.e. Belgian banks and Belgian subsidiaries of foreign banks) as well as 
their foreign branches and consequently exclude Belgian branches of foreign banks or foreign 
subsidiaries of Belgian banks. On a company basis, the Belgian banking system, at the end of 2002, 
comprises 65 banks representing assets of € 792 billion. The banking system is characterised by a 
high degree of concentration since the four largest banks account for 85 % of total assets of Belgian 
banks. This concentration results from several mergers that were concluded over the period 1998-
2001 and from an overall decrease in the number of banks.15 
 
As shown in  Table 1,  the interbank loans of Belgian banks represent a gross exposure of € 176 
billion at the end of 2002 while  interbank  deposits amount  to  € 228 billion. Over the period 
considered, interbank loans always account for 20 to 30 % of total assets of Belgian banks and 
interbank deposits for 30 to 40 % of their total liabilities (Table 2).16  
 
Interbank loans and deposits present similar structures. On both sides of the balance sheet, term and 
secured loans/deposits represent the larger portions of interbank positions (Table 1). The current 
level of secured loans is the consequence of a shift in the strategy of Belgian banks in the beginning 
of the 1990's, probably nurtured by the monetary policy reform in Belgium in 1991 which fostered 
the use of repos between Belgian banks (Table 2).17  
 
Another noteworthy characteristic of interbank positions of Belgian banks is their very high degree 
of internationalisation (Table 1 and Table 2). Belgium is a particularly open economy and so is its 
                                                 
11 i.e. Belgium, one of the other European Union member or the rest of the world. 
12 i.e. exposures exceeding 10 % of their own funds 
13 Reliable data on large exposures are only available from Q3-2002 onwards. 
14 The four largest banks detailed on average about 87% of the interbank exposures reported in their balance sheets. The 
average decreases to 67% for the remaining banks. 
15 On a company basis, the number of banks decreased by 47 banks from 112 in 1992 to 65 in 2002. 
16 These figures are in line with EMU averages although one can observe huge differences between some countries. 10. 
interbank market. Actually, at the end of 2002, less than 15 % of interbank exposures of Belgian 
banks were to other Belgian banks. These very high levels of internationalisation point out to a 
potential origin of the risk of contagion: given that the lion's share of the interbank exposure is 
situated abroad, Belgian banks might be more sensitive to international bank failures than to 
domestic ones.  
 
As shown in Table 3, interbank positions of Belgian banks are mostly short-term. Less than 5 % of 
the exposures are longer than one year and only about 24 % of interbank loans have a maturity 
exceeding 3 months.  
 
 
4. Empirical analysis of systemic risk on the Belgian interbank market  
 
 
4.1. Overview of the methodology 
 
The methodology, based on Upper and Worms (2002), aims at assessing the impact on the Belgian 
financial system of the sudden and unexpected default of each banking counterpart of Belgian 
banks. The test of contagion uses a ((N+M) x N) matrix of interbank bilateral exposures, X, to 
study the propagation mechanisms of crises. The matrix of bilateral exposures summarises the 
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where x ij represents the gross exposure of the Belgian bank i to the Belgian bank j, wij represents the 
gross exposure of the Belgian bank i to the foreign bank j, a i represents the domestic interbank 
assets of bank i, l j represents the domestic interbank liabilities of bank j and fai represents the 
foreign interbank assets of bank i. 
                                                                                                                                                    
17 We may expect the use of secured loans by Belgian banks to be further stimulated by the EU directive on Financial 
Collateral. 11. 
 
The simulations successively study the impact of the failure of each of the N Belgian banks and 
each of the M foreign banks for a given loss given default (LGD). The initial failure is assumed to 
cause an additional failure when the exposure of one bank to failed banks is large enough to offset 
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where Ci refers to the tier-I capital of bank i, q refers to the LGD and lj is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if bank j fails and 0 otherwise. The LGD is assumed to be constant and identical for all failed 
banks. We assume that in the event of bankruptcy, there is no netting so we use gross exposures xij 
and wij rather than net exposures (xij - x ji). The initial default may cause several rounds of failures 
when the combined effects of the failed banks trigger new failures at each round. The contagion 
stops when banks that failed during the last round do not cause any additional failures, i.e. when the 
system is again stable.  
 
The matrix of bilateral exposures is unknown and hence, must be estimated. We employ three 
estimation procedures. Each of them is based on different data on interbank exposures (i.e. data at 
an aggregate level or at an individual bank level). The first one (hereafter called large exposures 
technique) consists of using the matrix of bilateral exposures based on large exposures only. The 
second one  (hereafter called  aggregate exposures technique)  consists of using the information 
contained in the aggregates ai and l j and making an assumption on how they are distributed in the 
matrix. The third technique (hereafter called mixed technique) combines both of the previous data 
sources. We now provide details on each of the three alternatives. 
 
Banks are required to report their large interbank exposures (i.e. exposures to single counterparties 
exceeding 10 % of own funds). This kind of information allows us to fill in several cells in the 
matrix  of bilateral exposures but not to reconstruct the full matrix, since smaller exposures are 
omitted. The latter are probably less significant in terms of contagion risk. The large exposure data 
do not require any additional assumptions on the distribution o f bilateral  exposures, and they 
include exposures to foreign banks.   
 
The aggregate exposures technique is based on the observed  aggregates ai and l j,  which only 
provide incomplete information on interbank exposures of Belgian banks to Belgian banks, i.e. the 
column and row sums of the matrix X , i.e.  the marginal distribution of the x ij. Since this 
information is partial, we need to make an assumption on the distribution of the individual 
interbank exposures.  Following  other papers18,  we  assume that banks s eek to maximise the 
dispersion of their interbank activities. With the appropriate standardisation, this would be 12. 
equivalent to assuming a matrix X
0 such that x ij = ailj. However, such a distribution would neglect 
an important feature of the interbank market which is that banks do not have interbank exposures to 
themselves, so we have to add the constraint that xij = 0 for each i=j.  
 
The constrained matrix of bilateral exposures should, however, stay as close as possible to X
0. 
Technically, this is equivalent to minimising the distance function (DF) (measured by the relative 
entropy) between X
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      and (0 ln (0/0)) = 0. 
 
This kind of problem is easily solved with the RAS algorithm.20 Note, however, that this approach 
allows the construction of a matrix of bilateral exposures between Belgian banks only. The same 
exercise with foreign banks is indeed impossible as we unfortunately do not have information on 
liabilities of foreign banks. Estimations based on this technique consequently assume that fai are 
equal to zero.  
 
The third mixed technique mixes both approaches by incorporating large exposures in the matrix of 
bilateral exposures and by using the a i and l j,  net of large exposures, to calculate the residual, 
unreported, exposures. This is equivalent to  making an assumption on the distribution of smaller 
exposures only and it amounts to modifying the problem  (DF) by incorporating new constraints 
reflecting  the large exposures. However, since time-series of large exposures are not available, 
analyses over time are only based on the aggregate exposures technique. 
 
All of these techniques, and the general contagion exercise, involve biases - some of which tend 
toward underestimation and others toward overestimation of contagion risk.21  The sources of 
                                                                                                                                                    
18 Wells (2002), Upper and Worms (2002) and Elsingher et al. (2002). 
19 It can be shown that the matrix that minimises the relative entropy is asymptotically equal to the matrix with the most 
likely interbank loans and deposits distribution.  
20 See e.g. Blien and Graef (1997). 
21 A bias against contagion minimises Type II errors, i.e. incorrectly accepting a false hypothesis. This implies a trade-off 
in terms of Type I errors, i.e. incorrectly rejecting a true hypothesis. In other words, in the presence of a bias against 13. 
underestimation of contagion risk include the measure of interbank exposures, which  is based on 
interbank loans and deposits only and consequently  does not include other interbank exposures, 
such as off-balance-sheet exposures. The distributional assumption  with the aggregate exposure 
and mixed techniques of maximum dispersion of banks' interbank exposures also leads to an 
underestimation of contagion risk. Moreover, indirect effects of the failure of foreign banks are not 
taken into account, since we are not able to measure contagion between foreign banks.22 Another 
source of underestimation is the fact that credit risk is the only source of interbank contagion; 
liquidity risks23 are ignored. Furthermore, we use a conservative definition of bank failure as banks 
may fail before their tier-I capital is exhausted. Finally, bank panics by depositors are assumed not 
to occur.24 On the other hand, since banks are assumed not to be able to refinance or to raise 
additional capital, we overestimate contagion risk.  We also assume that they are not able to 
anticipate crises and to subsequently reduce their interbank exposures. The absence of safety nets 
also tends to generate an overestimation bias. Another source of overestimation is the measure of 
interbank exposures that is on a company basis and not on a consolidated basis.25 The extent to 
which contagion risk will actually be underestimated or overestimated in our simulations will 
obviously depend upon the importance of each of these sources. We test the sensitivity of o ur 
results to some of these biases in section 5. 
 
The fact that the contagion exercises are mechanical and potentially involve biases suggests that the 
results reported below should be interpreted in much the same spirit as those of a stress test. Yet, 
despite  the caveat, this type of exercise represents one of the only means of obtaining any 
quantitative assessment of interbank contagion risk. Moreover,  because this type of exercise has 
also been undertaken by other authors, it allows for some international comparisons. Furthermore, a 
consistent use of the methodology with time-series data allows estimating the evolution of the 
contagion risk over time. The results may thus provide general indications regarding the relative 
importance of different sources of interbank contagion.  
 
4.2. Structure of the Belgian interbank market 
                                                                                                                                                    
contagion, we might be able to state that there is a potential for contagion. On the other hand, we would not be able to say 
that contagion is non-existent. 
22 When we measure the impact on Belgian banks of the failure of a foreign bank, we disregard the "foreign second and 
further round effects".  However, the failure of a foreign bank is likely to have an impact on its domestic market, and 
some foreign banks (possibly counterparties of Belgian banks) may default subsequent to the first failure, worsening the 
overall situation of Belgian banks. We undertake a type of sensitivity analysis in Section 4.4. to try to compensate for this 
limitation. 
23 Liquidity risk is the risk that a bank experiences a liquidity shortfall because its counterparty fails to meet its 
obligations. For instance, a bank may face a liquidity shortfall because its counterparty postpones a repayment or because 
it takes time to realise collateral. 
24 Bank panics may occur following an individual bank's failure if depositors make inferences about systemic weakness 
based on observation of the individual failure (see Aghion et al., 2000). 
25 Interbank exposure data were not available on a consolidated basis. Although the use of data at a company level leads 
to the implicit assumption that cross-border intra-group exposures are between different banks, our actual simulations 
reveal few cases where such exposures cause "contagion." 14. 
 
Section 2.2.2. highlighted the tight link between the structure of the interbank market and the risk 
of contagion. Prior to any assessment of the contagion risk, it is insightful to better characterise the 
structure of the interbank market. In order to study the pattern of relationships between Belgian 
banks,  Table  4  presents a matrix of bilateral exposures based on  the mixed technique.26 For 
presentation purposes, we grouped banks by size in 5 groups (G1 to G5; so G1 is the group 
containing the largest banks).  Natural thresholds in bank size distribution were used in order to 
determine groups' composition. So G1 comprises the 4 banks whose assets exceed € 99 billion, G2 
comprises 5 banks with assets between  € 8 and 14 billion, G3 comprises 7 banks with assets 
between € 3 and 6 billion, G4 comprises 15 banks with assets between € 1 and 2.6 billion and G5 
comprises 34 banks with less than € 700 million in assets. Note that the number of groups that we 
use does not affect the results set out below, since bilateral interbank positions are determined 
before the grouping procedure. Note also that EMU, RoW and total interbank rows and columns 
are directly observed and they are thus not dependent on any distributional assumption. 
 
Interbank loans and deposits correlate with assets size (Table 4). As far as domestic interbank 
operations are concerned, we observe that most interbank transactions seem to transit through large 
banks. Indeed, positions between G1 banks and other banks exceed by far positions between G2 to 
G5 banks. This structure has not always been prevalent in Belgium. Table 5 shows the evolution 
over time of the total amount G2-G5 cells could account for.27 The first row of the table shows the 
maximum amount these cells could represent. This maximum is calculated independently from any 
distributional assumption. It is defined as the minimum  between the sum of domestic  interbank 
deposits of G2-G5 banks (i.e. the sum of the l j of G2 to G5 banks) and the sum of their domestic 
interbank loans (i.e. the sum of their ai).28 The second row of the table presents the observed G2-G5 
total in the aggregate exposure technique. Both series show a downward trend.  In 1993, the 
structure of the interbank market is more similar to a complete structure where estimated exposures 
between G2-G5 banks represent 36% of the domestic market (and could not exceed 68% with any 
alternative distributional assumptions). However, the interbank positions between G2-G5 banks 
decrease drastically between 1993 and 2002 (it is estimated to 8.1% with the aggregate exposure 
technique and to 10% with the m ixed technique).  So, although we  still  assume a complete 
structure29, small and medium-sized banks do not seem to have significant exposures to each other 
in 2002.  We observe the same trend in the maximum, which is independent of any distributional 
assumption (although the share of small and medium-sized banks is a little bit higher than with the 
                                                 
26 The same exercise based on large exposures or on the aggregate exposure techniques provides similar results.  
27 G1 banks are the large banks. We define large banks as banks whose assets exceed 10% of the total assets of the 
Belgian banking system. Note that our results are robust to alternative thresholds. 
28 By definition, the sum of G2-G5 cells will never exceed the minimum of domestic interbank loans and domestic 
interbank deposits of Belgian banks. In fact, taking the maximum of both amount may even constitute an overestimation 
of the total G2-G5 as it does not take account of constraints such as a null diagonal.   15. 
aggregate exposure technique). In fact, it mainly reflects the very high concentration of interbank 
positions in large banks on both sides of the balance sheet.30 
 
Although interbank activities with foreign banks are mainly concentrated in large banks (Table 4), 
access to international interbank markets does not seem to be strictly limited to large banks only.31 
Nevertheless, w e observe that the proportion of foreign interbank loans or deposits tends to 
decrease with  bank  size. There can be several rationales explaining this smaller share of 
international interbank activities: smaller banks may not reach the critical size or be internationally 
less known not allowing them to conclude transactions on the international interbank markets. This 
would be in line with one of the scenarios presented in Freixas and Holthausen (2001), where large 
banks with a good international reputation act as correspondent banks for their domestic peers in 
order to overcome asymmetric information problems.  
 
The very limited interbank positions between G2 to G5 banks, combined with their decreasing 
share of international financing suggests that large banks (G1) tend to operate as a money centre à 
la Freixas et al. (2000). One important difference in relation to the structure described by Freixas et 
al. (2000) would be that several money centres would be linked together, as reflected by the 
substantial position between the G1 banks.32 Thus, each large bank would function as a money 
centre linked to the other money centres. The Belgian interbank market would thus be characterised 
by a "multiple" money-centres structure vs. the "single" money centre of Freixas et al. (2000).  
 
4.3. Contagion triggered by the default of a Belgian bank 
 
4.3.1. Comparing results for large exposures, aggregate exposures and mixed techniques-Q4-2002. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the contagion exercise assuming that the initial interbank defaulter 
(the so-called "first domino") is a Belgian bank. The first panel of the table presents results where 
bilateral exposures come from the mixed technique, the second panel where bilateral exposures are 
based on large exposures and, the third panel where bilateral exposures are estimated on the basis 
of aggregate exposures. Results are reported for 5 different LGD. In December 2002, there were 65 
banks incorporated in Belgium, i.e. 65 potential sources of contagion. The table is thus based on 
975 different scenarios (i.e. 3 techniques x 5 LGD x 65 banks). The columns provide the results of 
the simulations for each technique and for each LGD. The second column gives the number of 
scenarios that generate contagion (each line summarises 65 different scenarios). The third column 
                                                                                                                                                    
29 Assuming a maximum dispersion of interbank activities is similar to assuming a complete structure of claims as 
described in Allen and Gale (2000).  
30 The concentration on the interbank market increased over the last decade. As far as interbank activities are concerned, 
the Herfindahl index currently exceeds 25 % while the market share of the five main players reaches about 90 % 
31 Note that international interbank positions are not subject to the distributional assumption. 16. 
presents the median  scenario. The median scenario gives the median value, across all of the 
scenarios where contagion occurs, of the percentage of total banking assets represented by banks 
losing their tier-I capital. The remaining columns provide some statistics on the state of the banking 
system in the worst-case scenario (defined as the scenario for which the percentage of total banking 
assets represented by banks losing their entire tier-I capital is greater). The table presents the 
percentage of assets represented by, and the number of, failing banks and banks losing respectively 
between 100 % and 70 %, between 70 % and 40 %, between 40 % and 10 % or less than 10 % of 
their tier-I capital.       
 
As Table 6 shows, the frequency of contagion occurring in the simulations is limited. Under the 
extreme assumption of 100 % LGD, only 18 out of the 65 unexpected Belgian bank defaults do 
cause the failure of another Belgian bank. The knock-on effects are also limited. In the median 
scenarios, the percentages of assets represented by banks losing their tier-I capital are extremely 
low. In a worst-case scenario, which is always caused by the default of a large bank, simulations 
show that banks that would lose their tier-I capital as a result of the interbank defaults never 
represent more than 4.4 % of the total assets of Belgian banks.33 Thus, the default of a Belgian 
bank in the interbank market, in the context of this exercise, does not cause a large Belgian bank to 
lose its entire tier-I capital. Moreover, if we assume an LGD of 40 %, which is probably more 
realistic given that secured loans account for more than 50 % of total interbank loans34, the losses 
are lower. In this case, banks accounting for more than 90 % of the assets lose less than 40 % of 
their tier-I capital. 
 
The t hree approaches deliver fairly  comparable results, especially for failing banks which are 
central to our analysis. This comparability validates our use of the aggregate exposures technique 
for the estimation of contagion risk over time that we will present in the next subsection. 
 
4.3.2. Simulations based on aggregate exposures: evolution over time 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
32 Unreported individual positions between large banks show that large banks hold cross-deposits in other large banks. 
33 This figure comes from the mixed technique. The figure decreases to 3 % for the simulations using large exposures 
data and to 3.8 % for simulations using aggregate exposures. 
34 The statistical estimation of an LGD for Belgian banks is very difficult, since fortunately very few Belgian banks have 
failed in the last decades. Moreover, actual losses on a defaulting bank can prove very complicated to calculate, since 
they depend on the time horizon chosen. Altman and Kishore (1996) estimate average recovery rates on defaulting bonds 
of financial institutions (for the period 1978-1995) to be about 36 % However, recovery rates vary by type of institution:  
mortgage banks 68 %, finance companies, 46 %; financial services, 42 %; commercial banks, 29 %; savings institutions, 
9 %. Moreover, the LGD for bonds is probably very different from the LGD for comparable loans (which in our case 
comprise secured and unsecured assets). James (1991) estimates that losses average 30 % of the failed bank's assets and 
that the direct expenses associated with bank closures average 10 % of assets, making a total of about 40 %. Seeing that 
more than 50 % of interbank loans granted by Belgian banks are secured, it may therefore be realistic to assume a 
recovery rate of somewhere between 60 and 80 % (i.e. an LGD between 40 and 20 %). 17. 
The question we address is whether contagion risk between Belgian banks evolved over time.  The 
simulations used to study the evolution of contagion over time are based on the aggregate exposure 
technique, and cover the period Q4-1992 to Q4-2002. We use 20 different LGD. Thus for each 
quarter, the number of scenarios tested amounts to 20 times the number of banks (between 65 and 
113). We use the propagation mechanism explained earlier. We study the evolution of three 
indicators of contagion over time. The first one is the previously defined worst-case scenario (and 
the assets represented by failing banks in the worst case scenario) (WCS). The second and third one 
are the percentage of banks initiating contagion when failing (CC), and the number of rounds of 
contagion for a given LGD in the worst case scenario (Round), respectively. The behaviour of the 
two first indicators over the period 1993-2002 is summarised  in Chart 1 (for 20 different LGDs) 
and the evolution of the third one is presented in  Table 7.35 Chart 1 shows that, over the last 
decade, the first indicator (worst-case scenarios) in the case of contagion triggered by a Belgian 
bank has been subject to three major changes. Between 1993 and 1997, the worst-case scenario 
consistently worsens. Between 1997 and 1999, the worst-case scenario improves; i.e., the curve in 
Chart 1 decreases each year. Finally, between 1999 and 2002 the curve flattens. Thus, the amount 
of contagion generated in simulations with current data appears to be at a record low. These trends 
are particularly striking for an LGD of 60 % In this case, the percentage of total banking assets 
affected by contagion, excluding the first domino, varies over the period from  86  % to 3  %. 
Although variations in the second indicator (the percentage of banks initiating contagion) are less 
pronounced, this indicator also evolves over time. Indeed, curves representing this indicator before 
1999 seem to indicate a greater potential for contagion than curves from 1999 onwards, at least for 
high levels of LGD.  
 
Table 7 shows the propagation mechanisms of contagion given a LGD of 60 %36, in the worst-case 
scenario, for the last ten years. The table presents the results for Q2 and Q4 of each year between 
1992 and 2002. Each row represents the worst case scenario of the quarter. A distinction is made 
between large banks (defined as banks  with assets exceeding 10  % of total assets of Belgian 
banks), medium sized banks (totalling in between 10 % and 3 % of total assets) and small banks. 
Each column represents an additional round of contagion. The table indicates that points in time 
where the worst-case scenario reaches its maximum are characterised by long periods of contagion 
(spreading over sometimes 11 rounds) with an important number of banks defaulting. It also shows 
that the default of a large bank is always directly preceded either by the default of another large 
bank, or by the default of a medium-sized bank. Indeed, the tier-I capital of large banks is never 
totally absorbed by the combined default of several small banks. However, the default of a small 
                                                 
35 For presentation purposes, Chart 1presents the results for Q2 only. However, tests reported in sub-section 4.3.3. show 
that the trends in the WCS presented in Chart 1 are not sensitive to the quarter chosen. However, in some rare cases and 
for some specific LGDs, the percentage of balance sheet assets affected by contagion might diverge from the general 
trend. 
36 The 60 % LGD was chosen as it was probably the level showing the most important variation in the WCS. 18. 
bank may trigger the failure of several small and medium-sized banks and in turn of a large bank. 
Note also that in some cases, no large bank fails, even in the worst case scenario. 
 
4.3.3. Factors influencing the domestic contagion 
 
Several factors could influence the incidence and impact of contagion. In subsection 2.2., we 
distinguished explanatory factors at the bank level, at the market level and at the regulatory level. 
We now investigate which factors influence our three previously defined domestic contagion 
indicators. This section focuses on explanatory factors related to the structure of the inter/bank 
market37.  
 
Two main trends in the banking landscape could explain the changes in our simulation results over 
the period 1993-2002. First, the estimated matrix of bilateral exposures underwent some structural 
changes, possibly reflecting changes of the interbank market structure and the rising concentration 
in the banking market. Indeed, as described earlier, large banks now seem to show an increased 
tendency to operate as multiple money centres38, where the failure of a bank linked to the money 
centre does not trigger the failure of the money centre itself. As shown by Freixas et al. (2000), for 
certain parameter values, a single money centre structure could reduce the contagion risk as banks 
at the periphery do no longer trigger contagion. A multiple money centres structure could also 
reduce contagion if the exposures between banks at the centre are such that they do not propagate 
contagion. These changes should impact the contagion indicators (see  the  Appendix for a 





A (estimated) money centre structure compared to a complete structure implies that: 
- if the money center bank is well capitalised, the worst case scenario (WCS) decreases; 
- if the money center bank is well capitalised, the number of cases of contagion (CC) decreases; 
- the number of rounds of contagion in a given scenario (Round) decreases. 
 
                                                 
37 Factors at the bank level, such as the increased recourse to risk mitigation techniques are already taken into account 
since the results are given for different LGDs. Moreover, we do not have information on particular netting agreements 
that would exist between Belgian banks. It is also difficult to take account of changes at the regulatory/supervisory level 
since the time period we use is limited and comprises several regulatory/supervisory initiative that could have 
overlapping results. Moreover, we think that using explanatory variables on the structure of the interbank market over 
time should allow us to capture regulatory and supervisory changes.  
38 Or, at least, the matrices used to calculate the contagion effect seem to show a trend towards a multiple money centres 
structure. 19. 
Second, following consolidation and international financial integration, large banks have further 
increased their cross-border interbank exposures.39 Consequently, the bilateral interbank exposures 
between the large Belgian banks could be such that they would no longer cause contagion between 




When banks decide to internationalise their interbank positions and to relatively reduce their 
domestic exposures, then following a domestic default, we expect that : 
- the worst-case-scenario (WCS) decreases;  
- the number of cases of contagion (CC) decreases;  
- the number of rounds of contagion in a given scenario (Round) could decrease  (because less 
banks will fail) or increase (if contagion processes propagate less rapidly). 
 
In order to test these two hypotheses, we define 8 variables (Table 8). The two first variables are 
directly related to our two hypotheses. They provide proxies to capture the structure of the 
interbank market (i.e. money centre vs. complete structure) and degree of internationalisation of 
banks, respectively. To capture the interbank market structure, we create a variable SB which 
measures the domestic interbank positions between small banks as a percentage of the total 
domestic positions.  In a money centre, this ratio should be equal to zero since small banks are not 
linked together. In a complete structure, we expect SB to be larger.40  The degree of 
internationalisation is proxied for by DOM which is defined as the domestic interbank positions as 
a percentage of the total interbank positions. This ratio indicates the level of internationalisation of 
interbank positions. A ratio equal to 1 would represent a "closed" system relying only on the 
domestic interbank market. A ratio equal to 0 would represent a fully internationalised system. 
Another variable captures another kind of structural change likely to impact on contagion, i.e. the 
leverage of banks (KIS). In order to control for macroeconomic changes, we use the GDP growth 
rate (GDP) and the term spread of the interbank interest rate (INT).41 Finally, we also use variables 
to control for potential seasonal effects (quarterly dummies Q2, Q3, Q4).42    
                                                 
39 Although the share of international interbank loans has always been high for large banks, it has increased over the last 
decade. In December 1992, the interbank loans granted by large Belgian banks to foreign banks accounted for 79 % of 
total interbank loans. This proportion reached 89 % at the end of 2002. 
40 In order to test the robustness of our results, we used an alternative proxy for the market structure: the Herfindahl 
index. Indeed, concentration in a money centre structure will tend to be higher than in a complete structure as the money 
centre bank tends to be larger than banks at its periphery. We observe that both proxies are highly correlated (-0.92) and 
that our results are robust to the definition of our proxy.  
41 Macro-economic conditions might affect the ability/willingness to take or grant interbank loans and might influence 
the behaviour of interbank players. Therefore, we need to control for these potential effects.  
42 For each variable, we performed Phillips-Perron tests to test for unit roots. The series appear stationary. We can reject 
the hypothesis of a unit root at a 10% level for all the independent and explanatory variables with exception of the WCS 
for an LGD of 80% and 60% and Dom and KIS. Although we can not formally reject the null hypothesis of unit roots for 
these series, there is a strong economic rationale to reject it as they are by construction constrained between zero and one. 20. 
We observe a relatively high correlation between the variables SB and DOM (Table 9). The fairly 
high correlation between these variables is not too surprising. Indeed, a decrease in SB causes an 
increase in concentration as large banks becomes more important. This might reduce competition. 
In order to increase competition and benefit from more advantageous conditions on their interbank 
transactions, banks may try to internationalise their interbank portfolio. A higher concentration then 
may lead to a higher degree of internationalisation. Technically, the relatively high correlation 
might prevent us from  obtaining statistically significant results when  including these variables 
jointly in a regression. In order to deal with  multicollinearity problems, we run regressions with 
each variable taken individually and both variables simultaneously.  
 
We run OLS regressions using quarterly data (Q4-1992 to Q4-2002) and estimate the following 
model for several LGDs: 
  
Contagion indicator given LGD = a + b GDP + f  INT + d KIS + g Quarter Dummies  + c market 
structure + error term 
 
With   contagion indicator = WCS, CC or Round  
    Market structure = SB or DOM  
 
The results are presented in Table 10 to Table 12. The three panels in Table 10 report the results 
using WCS as dependent variable, for levels of LGD 100%,  80% and 60%, respectively.43 We 
observe that for each LGD, SB and DOM lead to higher WCS. In other words, a 10% decrease in 
the SB (i.e. a move towards a money centre structure) would lead to a decrease of 23%, 29% and 
14% of the WCS for the 100%, 80% and 60% LGD respectively. Similarly, a 10% decrease in 
DOM (i.e. a higher internationalisation of interbank assets) would lead to a decrease in the WCS of 
38%, 41% and 23% for the 100%, 80% and 60% LGD respectively. KIS has generally negative 
coefficients although most of them are not significant. An increase in the average capitalisation of 
banks generates a decrease in the WCS.  
 
The regressions for the CC indicator of contagion (Table 11) show results similar to the WCS. The 
number of cases of contagion tends thus to decrease when moving to a money centre structure or 
when internationalisation increases. The number of rounds (Table 12) is positively affected by an 
increase in SB and DOM and negatively affected by an increase in KIS as expected. The number of 
rounds in the WCS is thus negatively affected by a move towards a money centre structure and by a 
higher internationalisation.  
                                                 
43 The results using the 40% and the 20% are less significant. This is not surprising as changes over time in the WCS, in 
CC or in round are much more important for an LGD of 100% than for an LGD of 20% where little or no contagion at all 
is observed.  21. 
 
The unreported coefficients of the quarterly dummy variables are in most cases insignificant. In 
other words, we do not observe any quarter effect on contagion indicators. The macroeconomic 
variables are also generally not significantly different from zero. 
 
Our results seem to be robust to the specification used. However, coefficients of SB or of DOM are 
sometimes not significant when used jointly while they are when each variable is used individually.  
 
Our results show  thus that the interbank market structure is important in explaining our three 
contagion indicators. As expected, SB and DOM are positively related with the WCS, the CC and 
Round. We observe that the money centre structure,  proxied by SB or by  the degree of 
concentration of the banking system and the internationalisation of interbank assets of Belgian 
banks (DOM) are all linked with our contagion indicators.  
 
4.4. Contagion triggered by the default of a foreign bank 
 
Banks' balance sheets data for the end of 2002 show that about 85 % of Belgian interbank loans are 
granted to foreign banks. Foreign interbank positions thus represent a potential source of contagion 
that may be more important than domestic contagion risk. We therefore extend the contagion 
exercise to the foreign interbank market. Table 13 reports the results of the contagion simulations 
when a foreign bank is the first defaulter (the "first domino").  Absence of data on the total 
interbank exposures of foreign banks vis-à-vis Belgian banks, however, prevents us from using the 
aggregate technique for our simulations. The simulations are therefore limited to the use of Belgian 
banks' large exposure data. Table 13 reports results for 5 different LGDs. We identify 135 foreign 
banks to which Belgian banks are exposed. The table is thus based on 675 different scenarios (each 
line representing 135 scenarios). The presentation of Table 13 is similar to Table 6. 
 
Table 13 shows that given a 100% LGD the default of one large foreign bank can lead to the failure 
of 7 Belgian banks whose assets account for 20 % of total Belgian bank assets. These numbers are 
considerably higher than the comparable figures for contagion simulations with Belgian banks as 
first domino’s. The results also indicate that even for a LGD of 40 %, the default of a foreign bank 
can, in the worst-case scenario, have a significant impact on Belgian banks. 44  
 
Interestingly, contagion occurs less frequently (in less than 10 % of cases) in the foreign-bank 
failure simulations than in the simulations where the first domino is a domestic bank.  At most 13 
of the 135 foreign counterparties listed by Belgian banks (in their reporting of large exposures) 
                                                 
44 Note that a small number of scenarios represented in Table 13 involve failures due to cross-border intra-group 
positions; however, these scenarios represent exceptions rather than the rule. 22. 
trigger contagion in our simulation. However, as discussed above, foreign bank failure can affect a 
larger proportion of Belgian banking assets. Note, however, that large differences exist between the 
median and the worst-case scenarios. For an LGD of 100  %, only 3 of the 13 simulations that 
involved contagion entailed the failure of banks representing at least 10 % of the total assets of the 
Belgian banking system. In addition, all of the foreign banks representing the first domino in the 
worst-case scenarios are European banks and all are ranked as investment grade, which suggests 
that actual interbank defaults by these banks are unlikely. Unfortunately, the absence of a long time 
series of bank large-exposure data prevents us from studying changes in the international risk of 
contagion over time.45 
 
Our contagion analysis can not incorporate indirect effects of the failure of foreign banks (i.e., 
failure of other foreign banks as a consequence of failure of a given foreign bank). One way to 
roughly take account of indirect effects would be to simulate the impact of the combined default of 
several foreign banks coming from the same country. Belgian banks provide a breakdown of their 
aggregate interbank exposures (the fai) by E.U. countries. The data are available for the last five 
years. Table 14 presents results of simulations where we assume that x % of the interbank exposure 
of Belgian banks to banks in a particular EU country are unrecoverable. We use the propagation 
mechanism explained earlier to measure the impact on the Belgian system. The first row of the 
table provides descriptive statistics on the exposure of Belgian banks to E.U. countries. The 5 
remaining  rows summarise the results of our simulations, for 5 different LGD.  The numbers 
represent the  percentages of Belgian banking assets  of failing Belgian banks. Simulations are 
calculated for each E.U. member (except Belgium).  
 
Table 14 shows, for example, that if Belgian banks suddenly become unable to recover 80 % of 
their interbank loans to French banks, Belgian banks representing 22  % of the total assets of 
Belgian banks would incur losses (directly or indirectly) exceeding their tier-I capital. It is perhaps 
surprising to observe that with the exception of France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 
simulations involving defaults on other countries’ interbank loans (including Germany and 
Luxemburg) do not result in significant contagion in the Belgian banking sector. For example, for 
an LGD of 100 %, a simulation of the failure of all German banks shows that Belgian banks losing 
their entire tier-I capital represent less than 1 % of total Belgian bank assets. Moreover, when we 
use lower LGDs, only bank defaults in the UK would yield significant levels of contagion in 
Belgium. This in fact reflects Britain’s role as a money centre and the importance of British banks 
as counterparts of Belgian banks.  
 
The previous results are not so stable over time. France and the U.K. often represent major risks. 
Other neighbouring countries at other times showed a higher potential for contagion. For instance, 
                                                 
45 Note that results for Q3-2002 are similar to results for Q4-2002. 23. 
in Q2-2000, a loss rate of 100  % on Germany would have offset the Tier-I capital of banks 
representing 93 % of the Belgian banking system. In Q2-1999, a loss rate of 100 % on Luxembourg 
would have had similar effects. These jumps in simulated country impact probably reflect larger 
interbank positions with those countries.  
 
The results of this section suggest that due to the increased international integration of interbank 
markets, in the Belgian context, the international risk of contagion may deserve more attention than 
domestic contagion risk.  
 
5. Further Sensitivity Analysis 
 
As mentioned earlier, the conclusions of our analysis are subject to different assumptions, leading 
to an over/underestimation of the contagion risk. The first subsection presents one more sensitivity 
test. We discuss two additional contagion exercises, relaxing each one an important assumptions. 
The first one related to the absence of a too-big-to-fail doctrine and the second linked to potential 
anticipations by banks.  The second subsection compares the results for Belgium with results 
obtained for other countries.   
 
5.1. Too-big-to-fail and Banks' expectations  
 
Not incorporating banks' expectations (the initial failure is assumed sudden and unexpected) and 
any kind of external bail-out leads to overestimation of the contagion risk. This sub-section aims 
firstly to measure this overestimation and secondly to study how the propagation effect is affected 
when these assumptions are relaxed. The contagion exercises presented in this section are based on 
the aggregate exposures technique with Belgian banks as first defaulter (see 4.3.2.).  Yet, we 
introduce two modifications to the propagation mechanism in order to take account of changes in 
the assumptions. 
 
First, we aim to incorporate banks’ expectations by assuming that banks are able to withdraw a part 
of their interbank assets before the failure of the initial bank. We assume that the part that may be 
withdrawn depends on the maturity structure of the interbank loans the bank has granted to the 
initial bank. On an aggregate basis, the residual maturity of more than 35 % of interbank loans 
granted by Belgian banks does not exceed 8 days (we may assume that much o f it is even 
overnight).46  The bank granting these short-term loans can decide not to renew them if it 
anticipates the failure of its debtor. In particular, we will  assume that banks correctly anticipate 
                                                 
46 Please note that the breakdown by maturity is unfortunately not available for Q2-1993.   24. 
failures and aims at withdrawing the short-term loans granted to failed banks before the failure. To 
the extent that they succeed, short-term positions no longer trigger contagion.47 
 
In order to estimate the short-term bilateral positions, we assume that the maturity structure of 
interbank loans granted to each counterpart of a given bank is the same.48 For instance, if 28 % of 
interbank assets of bank i have a shorter maturity than 8 days, we assume that 28 % of each 
interbank exposure of bank i can be withdrawn at each moment. If banks anticipate the failure of 
one bank, they are able to withdraw a part of their exposures, at the expense of the other creditors 
who will probably experience higher LGDs. 
 
Second, another potential bias is linked to the absence of any safety net. Although interbank loans 
are not covered by explicit deposit insurance, issues like "too-big-to-fail" (TBTF) may introduce 
implicit deposit insurance. We have therefore tried to assess the impact of a TBTF policy on the 
results. To proxy for TBTF, we assume in our simulation that large Belgian banks would not be 
allowed to fail.49 These banks would thus not create initial and additional contagion and could even 
stop it. This policy (i.e. the TBTF policy and the 10% threshold), however, constitutes a working 
assumption made by the authors in order to test the sensitivity of the results. There is absolutely no 
certainty regarding the effective application of such a threshold or such a policy in case of a large 
bank failure.   
 
The results are summarised in  Table  15 and  Table  16.  Table  15  presents the  results  for three 
different assumptions: the baseline case (as discussed in  4.3.2), and the two modified contagion 
exercises (Anticipation and TBTF). The first panel depicts the evolution in the number of cases of 
contagion over time under each of the three assumptions. The second panel presents the number of 
failing banks in the worst case scenario. The third row provides an overview of the WCS. Table 16 
gives an overview of contagion processes.  
 
The results in  Table  15 reveal that  the number of  observed cases of multiple banks failures 
significantly decreases when we assume that large banks are bailed-out. In particular, cases of 
multiple failures caused by the bankruptcy of a large bank in the first round no longer occur. The 
four cases of multiples failures  simulated  in Q2-2002 were all caused b y large banks and 
                                                 
47 Of course, such behaviour could also accelerate difficulties.  
48 We could have used the same assumption (i.e. aggregate exposure technique) as previously to break the short-term 
interbank loans and deposits down. However, banks do not make a distinction between Belgian and foreign counterparts 
when they report their maturity breakdowns so we do not dispose of the split of interbank loans / deposits granted by 
Belgian banks to Belgian banks (i.e. the short-term ai and lj).     
49 We define here large banks as banks representing more than 10 % of the total assets of Belgian banks.  25. 
consequently disappear, so that contagion totally vanishes50. Since contagion cases were often 
caused by large banks, the number of cases of contagion each year generally decreases by about 50 
%. Interestingly, though, this also shows that large banks were not always the only initiators of 
contagion.  Second, t he introduction of the banks' expectations  assumption does not drastically 
impact the number of cases of contagion, which remains generally unaffected by early withdrawal 
of short term exposures.  
 
The second panel shows that relaxing either of these two assumptions significantly decreases the 
maximal number of failing banks in case of contagion.51 On average, between 55 and 65 % of 
banks that previously failed in the worst-case scenario end up not failing when incorporating either 
TBTF or banks’ anticipations in the simulations. The number of failing banks remains however 
significant in several years.  
 
The third panel reveals that  incorporating TBTF or banks’ anticipation also decreases  the 
percentage of banks’ assets affected by the contagion in the worst-case scenario.52 The analysis of 
the impact of banks’ anticipation and TBTF is generally similar. The contagion still reaches 
significant levels but for high LGDs only which are less probable, especially taking into account 
the percentage of secured interbank deposits.  
 
The simulations incorporating the TBTF policy changes not only the incidence of contagion and its 
impact but also the way crises propagate. Table 16 presents how the pattern of contagion of the 
previously worst-case scenario (in the absence of safety net) for the period between Q2-1995 and 
Q2-199753 evolves with this TBTF assumption. The table compares contagion in the baseline case 
and under the TBTF assumption. Each column represents an additional round of contagion. In two 
cases (Q4-1995 and Q2-1996), the contagion is directly stopped since the first bank to fail was a 
large one. The number of rounds of contagion appreciably decreases. It is interesting to note that in 
each scenario, at least one large bank has to be rescued.    
 
5.2. International comparison 
 
Our results suggest that interbank contagion risk in Belgium has evolved over time. Any attempt to 
compare our results with the results of simulations for other countries must therefore take this time 
dimension into consideration. Table 17 compares our results with the results of other studies using 
                                                 
50 The fact that medium-sized and small banks do not initiate contagion tends to provide additional support for the 
multiple money centres structure hypothesis where banks at the periphery are not linked together and consequently do not 
initiate or propagate contagion. 
51 Rescued banks are counted as failed. 
52 Rescued banks are counted as failed and thus increase the % of total balance sheet assets affected excluding the first 
domino. However, they no longer propagate contagion. 
53 This period is chosen because it was the most damaging in terms of contagion. 26. 
the same methodology. It indicates that the simulated failure of a Belgian bank in December 1998 
produced weaker contagion effects than the simulated failure of a German bank in the same period, 
at least for high LGDs. Indeed, the worst-case scenario curves are higher for the German banking 
system than for the Belgian system except for the case of an LGD of 40 %. When we compare our 
results with those for the UK (Bank of England FSR), which uses data for end 2000, we find that 
the Belgian simulations produced a greater impact of contagion than for the UK. However, 
contagion occurred in a higher proportion of cases in the UK.     
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
 
The interbank market is a channel through which problems at one bank might spillover to other 
banks in the financial system. This paper has exploited a unique time series data set to analyse the 
risk  and impact of contagion due to interbank exposures of Belgian banks. We have used time 
series information on the total amounts of interbank exposures of Belgian banks as well as banks' 
reported large bilateral interbank exposures. This time series has allowed us to investigate the 
impact of interbank market structure and the increase in the international integration of interbank 
markets on the incidence and consequences of contagion. 
 
In our simulations, we start from data on interbank exposures and track the consequences of non-
repayment of (a fraction of) interbank loans on the equity capital of other banks, including any 
further domino-effects. This exercise is subject to an important caveat. The methodology does not 
allow to directly  incorporating the role of market expectations or potential preventive measures 
taken by regulators and individual banks. Nevertheless, the exercise provides insights regarding the 
potential impact of “stress” situations on the Belgian financial system. Within the constraints of the 
available data set, our simulations suggest that the risk of contagion due to domestic interbank 
defaults has decreased over the past decade.  
 
Our results reveal that the interbank market structure is important in explaining the time series 
behaviour of the incidence and impact of our contagion measures. The structure of the Belgian 
interbank market has moved over time from a complete structure  à la Allen and Gale (2000) 
towards a multiple money centres structure.  This  change in interbank market structure, 
accompanied by a rise in concentration, has decreased the risk and impact of contagion. 
 
Interbank exposures between Belgian banks currently represent only 15  % of total Belgian 
interbank exposures, suggesting that the potential contagion risk stemming from foreign interbank 
exposures is more important. Our simulations indeed suggest that the failure of some foreign banks 27. 
could have a sizeable effect on Belgian banks' assets. This result suggests that it is important for 
regulators to monitor potential cross-border sources of interbank systemic risk. 
 
The threat of contagion originating from foreign interbank borrowers, however, should probably 
not be exaggerated. First, our simulations indicate that cross-border interbank defaults have a major 
effect on the Belgian financial system only for high values of Loss Given Default (LGD). Belgian 
banks currently maintain relatively high proportions of secured interbank exposures, which tend to 
lower LGDs. Second, the foreign banks whose interbank defaults had significant effects in our 
simulations are all internationally recognised and have high investment grade ratings. Third, risks 
associated with foreign exposures appear to be concentrated in a very small number of countries.  
 
The current structure and characteristics of the Belgian interbank market reflect several changes 
that have taken place over the past decade. Integration of money markets at the European level, 
increased recourse by banks to s ecured interbank exposures and several major mergers between 
Belgian banks have resulted in a trend towards market tiering and appear to have reshaped the risk 
of contagion. In the coming years changes in the microstructure of interbank markets may further 
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Appendix . Complete structure vs. money centre. 
 
Starting from a complete structure, an interbank market could evolve towards a money centre 
structure. Ceteris paribus (i.e. Tier-1 capital of individual banks, LGD (q), liquidity needs, excess 
cash, etc. remain constant), which structure is more prone to contagion? 
 
The complete structure is characterised by a network of relations linking each bank of the system 
with all the other banks. In such structure each bank hold a deposit in all the other bank of the 
system. These deposits and the associated money flows are identified by lower-case letters, from e 
to p.  
 
 
If banks "decide" to move towards a interbank money centre structure, ceteris paribus, they will 
have the same liquidity needs and excess cash. For instance, B had previously a deposit in A 
amounting to f, a deposit in C amounting to g and a deposit in D amounting to o. It now has a 
deposit amounting to f+g+o in the money centre. Similarly, in the complete structure A, C and D 
were holding deposits in B amounting to e+h+p, which becomes, in the money centre structure, the 
deposit of A. Note that the net position of A remains unchanged. In the complete structure, the net 
position of A was equal to e+m+k-f-l-n and in the money centre structure : e+h+p+g+m+i+j+k+o-l-
i-p-h-j-n-f-g-o = e+m+k-f-l-n.  
 
 
The financing needs of banks belonging to the system are thus equally fulfilled in each structure. 
 
Quid of the risk of contagion? 
 
We assume the same propagation mechanism as in the simulation, i.e. tier-I capital must be offset 
by losses. The tier one capital of each bank is represented by a greek letter :  
 
    Tier I of A = a, 
    Tier I of B = b,  
    Tier I of C = c and  
    Tier I of D = d. 
 
1. The bank A fails : 
 
In the complete structure, the failure of bank A will cause additional failures if 
 
        b - qf < 0 ￿ b  < qf 
or if      c - qn < 0 ￿ c   < qn 
or if      d - ql < 0 ￿ d   < ql 32. 
 
In the money centre structure, the failure of bank A will cause another round of failure if 
 
        b - q(f+g+o) < 0 ￿ b  < q(f+g+o) 
or if      c - q(h+j+n) < 0 ￿ c   < q(h+j+n) 




In each case, when the bank A fails, the money centre structure seem to be more contagious than 
the complete structure, since: 
          qf = q(f+g+o) 
          qn = q(h+j+n) 
          and ql = q(l+i+p) 
 
However, contagion excluding first domino in the worst case scenario measured as a percentage of 
interbank assets of the system could be technically smaller since assets of A accounts for  
   
      (k+e+m)/(e+f+g+h+…+n+o+p) % of total interbank assets in the complete structure  
         
          and to  
 
      (e+h+p+g+m+i+j+k+o)/(e+f+g+…+n+o+p + o+p+g+h+j+i) % of total interbank   
    assets in the money centre structure 
 
      (say (k+e+m)/(e+f+g+h+…+n+o+p) = x/z and y = h+p+g+i+j+o) 
       
      then the assets of A represent x/z in the complete structure and (x+y)/(z+y) in the  
      money centre structure  
   
So the interbank assets of A will always represent a higher share of total interbank assets in a 
money centre structure than in a complete structure (unless y = 0 which would mean that there are 
no relationships between B, C and D and thus we would be in a money centre case…)  
  
Finally, in a money centre structure, there won't be a third round of failure after the failure of A 
while in the complete structure, third rounds are possible. 
 
2. Bank B fails (this could be C or D) 
 
In the complete structure, the failure of bank B will cause another round of failure if 
 
        a - qe < 0 ￿ a  < qe 
or if      c - qh < 0 ￿ c   < qh 
or if      d - qp < 0 ￿ d   < qp 
 
In the money centre structure, the failure of bank B will cause another round of failures if and only 
if 
 




•  The probability of failure of bank A following the direct failure of bank B is  not 
necessarily more important in a money centre than in a complete structure. Moreover, if 
A is well capitalised, the failure of bank B will not be able to trigger contagion on other 






When the money center fails, ceteris paribus, the propagation of contagion seems to be easier in a 
money centre than in a complete structure. However, if the money centre itself is robust enough, 
the complete structure could potentially lead to more contagion.  
 
Since we observe a natural concentration in a money center structure, when the money centre bank 
is the first domino, the observed contagion excluding the first domino could be technically reduced 
by the fact that the first domino is larger than the other one.  
 
In a simple money centre structure, we have maximum 3  rounds of contagion (including the first 
one), whatever the number of banks at the periphery. In a complete structure, the maximum number 
of rounds is equal to the number of banks.  34. 
Figure 1 – Interbank market structures and matrices of bilateral exposures 
 
  Complete Structure         Incomplete Structure   
   Bank A  Bank B  Bank C  Bank D       Bank A  Bank B  Bank C  Bank D 
Bank A  0  +  +  +    Bank A  0  +  0  0 
Bank B  +  0  +  +    Bank B  0  0  +  0 
Bank C  +  +  0  +    Bank C  0  0  0  + 
Bank D  +  +  +  0    Bank D  +  0  0  0 
                     
                     
  Money Centre        Disconnected Incomplete structure  
   Bank A  Bank B  Bank C  Bank D       Bank A  Bank B  Bank C  Bank D 
Bank A  0  +  +  +    Bank A  0  +  0  0 
Bank B  +  0  0  0    Bank B  +  0  0  0 
Bank C  +  0  0  0    Bank C  0  0  0  + 
Bank D  +  0  0  0    Bank D  0  0  +  0 
 
Note :  
Each matrix represents a stylised matrix of bilateral exposures. Each line represents the interbank assets of a bank and each column 
represents its interbank liabilities. + indicate positive positions 
 35. 
Table 1 - Structure of interbank loans and deposits of Belgian banks  
 
Interbank loans  Belgium  EMU   RoW  Total 
Sight deposits  603  1047  2017  3667 
  0.3%  0.6%  1.1%  2.1% 
Term loans  10909  48020  22816  81744 
  6.2%  27.2%  12.9%  46.3% 
Secured loans  10680  32623  43844  87147 
  6.1%  18.5%  24.8%  49.4% 
Other  3788  110  16  3914 
  2.1%  0.1%  0.0%  2.2% 
Total  25980  81799  68692  176472 
Interbank deposits             
Sight deposits  739  2892  2868  6499 
  0.3%  1.3%  1.3%  2.8% 
Term deposits  16771  26670  80927  124368 
  7.3%  11.7%  35.4%  54.4% 
Secured deposits  15308  46425  35894  97627 
  6.7%  20.3%  15.7%  42.7% 
Total  32818  75988  119688  228494 
Source : NBB 
Note : December 2002, € million 
 36. 
Table 2 - Interbank loans and deposits of Belgian and EMU banks 
 
   1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
EMU BANKS                                  
Interbank loans  25.9%  26.5%  25.8%  28.5%  26.1%  25.6%  24.6%  23.3%  22.1%  22.6%   
Interbank deposits  26.2%  26.2%  26.7%  30.1%  27.9%  28.2%  28.4%  27.5%  26.7%  26.2%   
Net position  -0.3%  0.2%  -0.9%  -1.5%  -1.8%  -2.5%  -3.8%  -4.2%  -4.6%  -3.6%   
                                   
BELGIAN BANKS                                  
Interbank loans  22.1%  23.1%  23.1%  25.7%  26.5%  25.3%  25.3%  24.3%  19.7%  21.6%  22.2% 
Interbank deposits  28.3%  29.0%  29.9%  33.3%  34.8%  34.6%  34.3%  35.1%  31.1%  30.3%  28.7% 
Net position  -6.2%  -5.9%  -6.8%  -7.6%  -8.3%  -9.2%  -9.0%  -10.8%  -11.4%  -8.7%  -6.5% 
                       
Secured interbank loans  7.2%  15.0%  20.6%  24.8%  29.4%  29.4%  34.1%  44.3%  40.7%  41.2%  50.5% 
Domestic interbank loans  29.3%  32.4%  30.5%  32.1%  37.1%  33.9%  37.3%  26.9%  21.3%  22.5%  14.7% 
 
Source : OECD, NBB. 
 
Note : The percentages represent the share of interbank assets and deposits in total assets. They are based on weighted average. 
Figures for December of each year. 
EMU banks: all banks except for Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal : commercial banks only; Ireland from 1995 onwards only. 




Table 3 - Residual maturity of interbank loans and deposits of Belgian banks 
 
  
<= 8 days 
8 days - 1 
month  1-3 month  3-6 months 
6 months - 1 
year  > 1 year 
Un-
determined 
Loans  28.0%  22.6%  25.3%  11.5%  8.4%  2.9%  1.3% 
Deposits  39.5%  25.4%  17.2%  9.3%  6.7%  1.8%  0.1% 
 
Source: NBB. 
Note : The table provides a breakdown of interbank loans and deposits according to their residual maturity. Percentages are percentages 
of total interbank loans and deposits. December 2002.   38. 
Table 4 - Bilateral interbank exposure by size categories - December 2002 
   
 
 
   
 % of 
assets of 
banking 








 G1   85.06%  14.3  1.0  6.1  2.4  2.2  70.6  64.0    160.5  84% 
 G2   6.83%  2.8  0.1  0.8  0.6  0.1  4.2  2.8    11.4  62% 
 G3   3.51%  3.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.1  0.2    8.6  62% 
 G4   3.35%  2.9  0.2  0.1  0.5  0.4  0.9  1.4    6.3  35% 
 G5   1.26%  1.8  0.1  0.3  0.9  0.1  1.0  0.3    4.5  30% 
 EMU      71.4  3.0  0.6  0.8  0.2                
 RoW      111.7  3.3  1.5  2.6  0.6                
                                   
 Total interbank deposits   208.0  7.8  9.5  7.8  3.5                
 % of foreign interbank 
deposits   88%  82%  23%  43%  20%                
 
Source : own calculation 
 
Note : Figures in billions of euros 
December 2002. 
Domestic exposures : Estimates of the matrix of bilateral exposures based on the mixed technique. The mixed technique combines two 
sources of information: large exposures and total interbank loans and deposits of each individual bank. It maximises the distribution of 
total interbank loans and deposits taking account of constraints on large exposures.  
Banks were grouped by size for expositional purposes. G1 comprises the 4 banks whose assets exceed € 99 billion, G2 comprises 5 
banks with assets between € 8 and 14 billion, G3 comprises 7 banks with assets between € 3 and 6 billion, G4 comprises 15 banks with 
assets between € 1 and 2.6 billion and G5 comprises 34 banks with less than € 700 million in assets.  
Foreign exposures : based on reported figures.  
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Maximum  68.1%  42.4%  48.2%  46.5%  53.6%  40.4%  33.5%  40.0%  40.4%  23.2%  25.8% 
Aggregate 
exposure 
technique   36.4%  30.0%  32.0%  30.7%  35.4%  17.1%  14.6%  20.5%  18.5%  6.1%  8.1% 
 
Source : own calculation 
 
Note : The percentages represent the maximum and the calculated percentages of the domestic interbank exposures small and medium-
sized banks account for. Figures are for the second quarter of each year. The percentages are percentages of total aggregate exposures of 
Belgian banks. The maximum is based on the minimum of the total interbank loans and total interbank deposits of small and medium-
sized banks. The calculated percentages are computed on the basis of the aggregate exposure technique. 40. 
Table 6 - Contagion exercise: Belgian bank as initial defaulter 
Worst Case Scenario (excluding first domino) 
Banks failing  Banks losing 100-70% 
of tier-I capital 
Banks losing 70-40% of 
tier-I capital 
Banks losing 40-10% of 
tier-I capital 
Banks losing less than 













balance sheet assets 
represented by failing 
banks (excluding 
































Mixed technique at Q4 – 2002 
100  18  0.48%  4.38%  21  14.54%  10  20.78%  8  38.57%  12  21.72%  14 
80  15  0.48%  3.91%  20  0.81%  5  2.91%  9  68.72%  13  23.64%  18 
60  14  0.48%  3.77%  15  0.08%  4  19.03%  9  36.42%  18  40.71%  19 
40  10  0.39%  2.74%  7  0.84%  3  0.08%  4  36.08%  20  60.26%  31 
20  5  0.14%  0.71%  = 2  0.14%  = 2  0.61%  5  5.79%  20  92.75%  37 
Large Exposures at Q4 – 2002 
100  12  0.46%  2.97%  4  0.01%  = 2  0.29%  3  2.34%  6  94.38%  51 
80  10  0.44%  2.27%  9  0.16%  4  1.14%  = 2  32.68%  11  63.75%  40 
60  10  0.16%  1.77%  = 2  0.33%  4  0.08%  = 2  14.05%  7  83.77%  51 
40  7  0.14%  1.77%  = 2  0.00%  = 2  0.37%  5  13.98%  5  83.88%  54 
20  3  0.03%  0.14%  = 2  0.00%  = 2  0.00%  = 2  0.07%  4  99.79%  60 
Aggregate Exposures at Q4 – 2002 
100  4  3.33%  3.79%  17  0.09%  3  53.67%  17  2.29%  12  40.17%  16 
80  4  2.13%  3.75%  15  0.03%  = 2  0.94%  9  55.01%  21  40.27%  18 
60  4  1.73%  3.33%  11  0.42%  4  0.12%  5  55.67%  25  40.46%  20 
40  2  2.98%   3.04%  9  0.29%  = 2  0.45%  6  55.23%  25  40.98%  23 
20  2  0.50%  0.50%  3  0.00%  = 2  2.54%  6  1.31%  12  95.66%  44 
 Source : own calculation 
Note : The table presents the results of the contagion exercises for December 2002 assuming that the first defaulter is a Belgian bank. The first panel of the table is based on a matrix of bilateral exposure estimated with the 
mixed technique, the second panel on the large exposures technique and the third on the aggregate exposures technique. Results are reported for 5 different LGD. Each line is based on 65 different scenarios (i.e. the individual 
failure of each of the 65 Belgian banks). The second column gives the number of scenarios that generate contagion (each line summarises 65 different scenarios). The third column presents the median scenario. The median 
scenario gives the median value, across all of the scenarios where contagion occurs, of the percentage of total banking assets represented by banks losing their tier-I capital. The remaining columns provide some statistics on the 
state of the banking system in the worst-case scenario (defined as the scenario for which the percentage of total banking assets represented by banks losing their entire tier-I capital is greater). The table presents the percentage of 
assets represented by, and the number of, failing banks and banks losing respectively between 100 % and 70 %, between 70 % and 40 %, between 40 % and 10 % or less than 10 % of their tier-I capital. Cells where there is two 
or less than two banks are marked with the symbol = 2 in order to make single bank identification impossible.      41. 
Table 7 - Contagion propagation over time for a LGD of 60% - Worst case scenario - number of failing 
banks at each round of contagion.  
 















Small 5 7 1
dec-99 Large 1 1
Medium 1
Small 1 21 8 1
jun-99 Large 1
Medium 1
Small 7 8 1
dec-98 Large 1 1 1
Medium 1
Small 9 9 3 5 2
jun-98 Large 1 1
Medium 1
Small 3 1 7 11 3
dec-97 Large 1
Medium 1
Small 3 7 9 1 2
jun-97 Large 1 2 1
Medium 1 1
Small 1 2 9 4 10 10 2 2
dec-96 Large 1 2
Medium 1 1 2
Small 1 2 1 10 2 1 13 6
jun-96 Large 1 2 1
Medium 1 1
Small 5 9 6 13 6
dec-95 Large 1 1 1 1
Medium 1 1
Small 3 3 1 1 7 6 6 4 3 6
jun-95 Large 1 2 1
Medium 1
Small 1 3 2 12 8 10 2
dec-94 Large 1
Medium 1 1
Small 3 5 5 5 9 5
jun-94 Large 1
Medium 1
Small 3 8 3 8 9
dec-93 Large 1
Medium 1 1
Small 3 1 13 7 3 1
jun-93 Large
Medium
Small 1 3 4 1 4
dec-92 Large
Medium
Small 1 2 2  
 
Source : own calculation  
 
Note : The table presents the number of banks failures for each round of contagion. Each row represents a different quarter. The columns 
represent the different rounds of contagion. The first round is constituted by the first domino. For each round, the table provides the 
number of large (>10% assets), medium-sized (> 3% of assets) and the small banks failing. The table is based on contagion exercises 
using the aggregate exposure technique to estimate the matrix of bilateral exposures.   
 42. 
Table 8 - Definition of explanatory variables 
Variable  Definition  Rationale  Min  Max  Median 
Variables capturing the hypotheses 
SB  Domestic interbank 
positions between small 
banks as a percentage of 
the total domestic 
positions. 
Proxies for the type of interbank market structure. In a 
money centre, this ratio should be equal to zero since 
small banks are not linked together. To the extent that the 
structure moves to a complete structure, this ratio 
increases.  
0.059  0.364  0.300 
DOM  Domestic interbank 
positions as a percentage 
of the total interbank 
positions. 
This ratio indicates the level of internationalisation of 
interbank positions. A ratio equal to 1 would represent a 
"closed" system relying only on the domestic interbank 
market. A ratio equal to 0 would represent a fully 
internationalised system. 
0.147  0.373  0.297 
Variables capturing other structural changes 
KIS  Non-weighted average of 
the ratio  Tier-I capital of 
Belgian banks on assets 
of Belgian banks. 
A higher capitalisation of banks should increase their 
resiliency to shocks and decreases indicators of 
contagion. 
0.075  0.109  0.089 
Variables capturing macroeconomic evolution 
GDP  Quarterly GDP growth.  Banks profits should increase when the GDP growth is 
high as the quality of their assets improves.  
-0.041  0.058  0.017 
INT  Term spread of the 
interbank interest rate 
(Bibor before 1999 and 
Euribor from 1999 
onwards) 
The term spread of the interbank interest rate represents 
the difference between the 1-year and the 1-month 
interbank interest rate. A high spread will constitute a 
positive environment for banks whose interbank liabilities 
are short-term and whose interbank assets are long term 
(which is to a certain extent the position of Belgian banks 
- see Table 3). A low spread on the other hand will 
constitute a negative environment for these banks.    
-0.016  0.019  -0.002 





Control for seasonal effects           
 43. 
Table 9 - Correlation between variables 
   SB  DOM  KIS  GDP  INT 
SB  1.00  0.76  -0.55  0.01  0.11 
DOM    1.00  -0.53  0.12  -0.04 
KIS      1.00  -0.35  0.44 
GDP        1.00  -0.67 
INT          1.00 
 
Note:  The table presents the correlation coefficient between the 5 explanatory variables. SB represent the share of interbank market 
small and medium-sized banks account for, DOM represents the interbank domestic exposure of Belgian banks, KIS is the non weighted 
average of the ratio Tier-I capital on assets of Belgian banks GDP is the quarterly GDP growth rate and INT is the term spread of the 
interbank interest rate.44. 
Table 10 - Regression results for WCS. 
 
Intercept  GDP  INT  KIS  SB  DOM  R²  DW 
LGD = 100% 
0.41  2.03  0.88  -3.41  2.28    0.61  1.3 
(0.67)  (0.87)  (0.10)  (-0.58)  (4.69)***       
-0.01  1.74  6.06  -4.26    3.80  0.73  1.3 
(-0.01)  (0.89)  (0.92)  (-0.96)    (6.82)***     
-0.33  1.59  1.79  -0.69  0.89  3.02  0.76  1.6 
(-0.62)  (0.84)  (0.26)  (-0.15)  (1.75)*  (4.33)***     
LGD = 80% 
0.35  -1.04  -9.98  -4.92  2.87    0.73  1.0 
(0.61)  (-0.47)  (-1.24)  (-0.89)  (6.27)***       
0.30  -1.15  -1.26  -9.15    4.10  0.75  1.2 
(0.54)  (-0.54)  (-0.18)  (-1.90)*    (6.79)***     
-0.29  -1.42  -9.18  -2.52  1.65  2.66  0.81  1.5 
(-0.57)  (-0.77)  (-1.37)  (-0.54)  (3.33)***  (3.89)***     
LGD = 60% 
1.22  0.74  -10.28  -13.33  1.36    0.59  1.1 
(1.89)*  (0.30)  (-1.15)  (-2.17)**  (2.66)**       
0.91  0.53  -7.48  -13.43    2.35  0.64  1.4 
(1.52)  (0.23)  (-0.96)  (-2.57)**    (3.58)***     
0.74  0.46  -9.70  -11.57  0.46  1.95  0.65  1.3 
(1.16)  (0.20)  (-1.15)  (-1.99)*  (0.74)  (2.28)**       
 
Note : 
Dependent variable is the worst case scenario measured as the percentage of total assets failed banks account for (WCS). Explanatory 
variables are GDP (the quarterly GDP growth rate), INT (the term spread of the interbank interest rate), KIS (the non weighted average 
of the ratio Tier-I capital on assets of Belgian banks), SB (the share of interbank market small and medium-sized banks account for),  
DOM (the interbank domestic exposure of Belgian banks) and three dummy variables for the quarters (not reported).  Each cell displays 
the t-statistic for the OLS coefficient. For each OLS estimation, the R² and the Durbin-Watson are given.  
The sample comprises 41 observation (one per quarter between Q4-1992 and Q2-2002).  
The first panel of the table assumes an LGD of 100%, the second panel a LGD of 80% and the third panel a LGD of 60%. 
Significance level of the t-tests: (***) at the 1 % level, (**) at the 5 % level and (*) at the 10 % level. 
Source: own calculation 45. 
Table 11. Regression results for CC. 
 
Intercept  GDP  INT  KIS  SB  DOM  R²  DW 
LGD = 100% 
0.35  0.77  1.36  -1.26  1.14    0.67  1.2 
(1.35)  (0.78)  (0.38)  (-0.51)  (5.55)***       
0.38  0.75  5.06  -3.28    1.55  0.67  0.9 
(1.46)  (0.75)  (1.49)  (-1.44)    (5.42)***     
0.13  0.64  1.64  -0.42  0.71  0.93  0.74  1.3 
(0.50)  (0.71)  (0.50)  (-0.19)  (2.95)***  (2.79)***     
LGD = 80% 
0.24  -0.11  -3.27  -0.93  1.25    0.70  1.3 
(0.93)  (-0.11)  (-0.92)  (-0.38)  (6.16)***       
0.34  -0.09  1.09  -3.60    1.60  0.65  1.3 
(1.24)  (-0.09)  (0.31)  (-1.51)    (5.33)***     
0.03  -0.23  -3.01  -0.17  0.85  0.85  0.75  1.5 
(0.12)  (-0.26)  (-0.92)  (-0.07)  (3.53)***  (2.54)**     
LGD = 60% 
0.81  0.70  -5.04  -6.85  0.38    0.68  1.3 
(3.55)***  (0.80)  (-1.60)  (-3.16)***  (2.13)**       
0.63  0.59  -4.69  -6.24    0.81  0.74  1.6 
(3.07)***  (0.74)  (-1.75)*  (-3.48)***    (3.58)***     
0.62  0.58  -4.81  -6.15  0.02  0.79  0.74  1.6 
(2.79)***  (0.73)  (-1.65)  (-3.05)***  (0.11)  (2.65)**       
 
Note : 
Dependent variable is the number of cases of contagion in the worst case scenario (CC). Explanatory variables are GDP (the quarterly 
GDP growth rate), INT (the term spread of the interbank interest rate), KIS (the non weighted average of the ratio Tier-I capital on assets 
of Belgian banks), SB (the share of interbank market small and medium-sized banks account for),  DOM (the interbank domestic 
exposure of Belgian banks) and three dummy variables for the quarters (not reported).  Each cell displays the t-statistic for the OLS 
coefficient. For each OLS estimation, the R² and the Durbin-Watson are given.  
The sample comprises 41 observation (one per quarter between Q4-1992 and Q2-2002). 
The first panel of the table assumes an LGD of 100%, the second panel a LGD of 80% and the third panel a LGD of 60%. 
Significance level of the t-tests: (***) at the 1 % level, (**) at the 5 % level and (*) at the 10 % level. 
Source: own calculation 46. 
Table 12. Regression results for Round. 
Intercept  GDP  INT  KIS  SB  DOM  R²  DW 
LGD = 100% 
3.20  -7.87  -47.00  60.61  10.33    0.29  1.6 
(0.59)  (-0.38)  (-0.63)  (0.12)  (2.43)**       
2.47  -8.56  -18.15  -5.56    15.52  0.32  1.6 
(0.47)  (-0.42)  (-0.26)  (-0.12)    (2.69)**     
0.56  -9.44  -43.75  15.86  5.33  10.86  0.34  1.7 
(0.10)  (-0.47)  (-0.60)  (0.31)  (0.99)  (1.46)     
LGD = 80% 
-8.57  -18.71  -113.65  100.42  25.34    0.63  0.9 
(1.67)  (-0.96)  (-1.60)  (2.06)**  (6.27)***       
-2.18  -15.98  -4.69  16.90    26.11  0.43  0.8 
(-0.35)  (-0.66)  (-0.06)  (0.31)    (3.79)***     
-10.18  -19.66  -111.67  106.40  22.29  6.63  0.64  0.9 
(-1.88)*  (-1.01)  (-1.57)  (2.16)**  (4.25)***  (0.92)     
LGD = 60% 
5.58  7.23  -151.89  -48.89  17.82    0.80  2.1 
(1.51)  (0.51)  (-2.97)***  (-1.39)  (6.10)***       
8.93  8.54  -80.56  -100.00    20.02  0.72  1.7 
(2.08)**  (0.52)  (-1.43)  (-2.66)**    (4.23)***     
3.77  6.16  -149.66  -42.18  14.40  7.43  0.81  2.2 
(0.98)  (0.44)  (-2.97)***  (-1.21)  (3.87)***  (1.45)       
 
Note : 
Dependent variable is the number of rounds of contagion in the worst case scenario (CC). Explanatory variables are GDP (the quarterly 
GDP growth rate), INT (the term spread of the interbank interest rate), KIS (the non weighted average of the ratio Tier-I capital on assets 
of Belgian banks), SB (the share of interbank market small and medium-sized banks account for),  DOM (the interbank domestic 
exposure of Belgian banks) and three dummy variables for the quarters (not reported).  Each cell displays the t-statistic for the OLS 
coefficient. For each OLS estimation, the R² and the Durbin-Watson are given.  
The sample comprises 41 observation (one per quarter between Q4-1992 and Q2-2002). 
The first panel of the table assumes an LGD of 100%, the second panel a LGD of 80% and the third panel a LGD of 60%. 
Significance level of the t-tests: (***) at the 1 % level, (**) at the 5 % level and (*) at the 10 % level. 




Table 13 - Contagion exercise : Foreign bank as initial defaulter 
 
Worst Case Scenario (excluding first domino) 
Banks failing  Banks losing 100-70% 
of tier-I capital 
Banks losing 70-40% of 
Tier-I capital 
Banks losing 40-10% of 
tier-I capital 
Banks losing less than 













balance sheet assets 
represented by failing 
banks (excluding 







































fail in the 
WCS 
Large Exposures at Q4 – 2002    
100  13  0.07%  20.01%  7  0.00%  = 2  1.02%  5  67.36%  8  11.61%  45  AA- 
80  9  0.04%  19.97%  6  0.04%  = 2  0.44%  3  32.34%  6  47.21%  49  AA+ 
60  8  0.04%  18.15%  4  1.82%  = 2  0.04%  = 2  32.78%  9  47.21%  49  AA+ 
40  3  0.08%  18.08%  = 2  0.04%  = 2  1.89%  4  20.22%  7  59.77%  51  AA+ 
20  1  0.08%  0.08%  = 2  0.00%  = 2  0.00%  = 2  0.00%  = 2  99.92%  64  A 
 
Source : own calculation 
Note : The table presents the results of the contagion exercises for December 2002 assuming that the first defaulter is a foreign bank. The table is based on a matrix of bilateral exposure estimated with the large exposures 
technique. Results are reported for 5 different LGD. Each line is based on 65 different scenarios (i.e. the individual failure of each of the 65 Belgian banks). The second column gives the number of scenarios that generate 
contagion (each line summarises 135 different scenarios). The third column presents the median scenario. The median scenario gives the median value, across all of the scenarios where contagion occurs, of the percentage of 
total banking assets represented by banks losing their tier-I capital. The remaining columns provide some statistics on the state of the banking system in the worst-case scenario (defined as the scenario for which the percentage 
of total banking assets represented by banks losing their entire tier-I capital is greater). The table presents the percentage of assets represented by, and the number of, failing banks and banks losing respectively between 100 % 
and 70 %, between 70 % and 40 %, between 40 % and 10 % or less than 10 % of their tier-I capital. Cells where there are two or less than two banks are marked with the symbol = 2 in order to make single bank identification 
impossible.      
      48. 
Table 14 - Sensitivity of Belgian banks to losses on their interbank exposures to other countries. 
 
   AT  DE  DK  ES  FI  FR  GR  IE  IT  LU  NL  PT  SE  UK 
% of total 
interbank assets  0.70%  7.60%  0.50%  3.20%  0.20%  10.00%  0.60%  6.50%  1.30%  2.80%  10.10%  0.80%  0.10%  27.10% 
Loss Rate                             
100  0%  1%  0%  0%  0%  22%  0%  0%  0%  0%  42%  0%  0%  94% 
80  0%  1%  0%  0%  0%  22%  0%  0%  0%  0%  41%  0%  0%  41% 
60  0%  1%  0%  0%  0%  22%  0%  0%  0%  0%  40%  0%  0%  40% 
40  0%  1%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  40% 
20  0%  1%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
Source : own computations 
Note : December 2002. 
The first row of the table provides the percentage of total interbank exposures of Belgian banks each EU country accounts for. The remaining rows provide the results of the contagion exercise assuming that all the banks of a 
country default at the same time. Results are provided for several loss rates. The results are percentages of total assets of the Belgian banking system the failed Belgian banks account for. The calculations are based on figures on 
a territorial basis. Country abbreviations are AT (Austria), DE (Germany), DK (Denmark), ES (Spain), FI (Finland), FR (France), GR (Greece), IE (Ireland), IT (Italy), LU (Luxembourg), NL (Netherlands), PT (Portugal), SE 
(Sweden), UK (United Kingdom). 
 49. 
Table 15 – Contagion: Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) and Anticipation vs. baseline. 
 
Assumption  LGD  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
number of cases of contagion 
Baseline  100  9  26  8  9  9  8  5  4  4  4 
  60  7  20  7  5  6  4  5  4  4  4 
   20  0  12  1  0  0  1  2  1  3  2 
Anticipation  100  NA  24  7  9  9  3  5  4  4  4 
  60  NA  20  5  5  5  1  5  4  4  4 
   20  NA  11  0  0  0  0  0  0  3  1 
TBTF  100  3  21  4  5  5  3  1  1  1  0 
  60  2  15  3  2  2  1  1  1  1  0 
  20  0  7  1  0  0  0  1  1  1  0 
number of banks failing in the WCS 
Baseline  100  72  85  67  63  58  50  43  26  24  14 
  60  14  34  41  45  45  28  18  15  16  9 
   20  1  2  2  1  1  2  2  2  2  2 
Anticipation  100  NA  11  49  41  34  23  2  11  11  7 
  60  NA  5  23  12  24  4  6  10  8  3 
   20  NA  2  1  1  1  1  1  1  2  2 
TBTF  100  48  64  43  44  45  10  13  13  13  1 
  60  14  15  22  16  24  5  10  7  8  1 
  20  1  2  2  1  1  1  2  2  2  1 
WCS 
Baseline  100  90.9%  92.0%  87.5%  91.0%  93.3%  82.7%  78.8%  15.5%  13.7%  3.3% 
  60  3.3%  14.1%  58.5%  73.0%  86.4%  35.7%  13.6%  13.2%  11.5%  2.9% 
   20  0.0%  1.2%  0.6%  0.0%  0.0%  0.5%  0.5%  0.4%  0.3%  0.3% 
Anticipation  100  NA  2.9%  73.8%  78.2%  75.5%  50.2%  60.2%  10.3%  9.5%  2.5% 
  60  NA  1.9%  29.6%  11.3%  55.9%  8.9%  3.1%  9.7%  8.6%  0.4% 
   20  NA  1.8%  1.1%  0.6%  0.6%  0.0%  0.5%  0.4%  0.3%  0.3% 
TBTF  100  42.5%  87.8%  75.9%  85.3%  88.9%  5.5%  4.1%  6.1%  4.8%  0.0% 
  60  3.3%  4.2%  41.2%  10.2%  55.0%  2.4%  3.9%  2.4%  4.1%  0.0% 
   20  0.0%  1.2%  0.6%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.5%  0.4%  0.3%  0.0% 
 
Source : own calculation 
Note : Figures for Q2 of each year.  The table presents the evolution of three contagion indicators under three different assumptions. The 
first panel presents the evolution over time in the number of cases of contagion, the second panel presents the evolution in the number of 
banks failing in the WCS and the third panel presents the worst case scenario, measure as the percentage of total assets failed banks 
account for. Each panel presents a comparison of the results obtained under the assumptions of the basic model, under the assumption 
regarding banks anticipations and under the assumptions of a too-big-to-fail  (TBTF) mechanism.  Results are provided for three 
different LGDs. 50. 
Table 16 - Contagion propagation over time for a LGD of 60% in presence of a Too-Big-To-Fail 
assumption. 
 
1st round 2nd Round 3rd Round 4th Round 5th Round 6th Round 7th Round 8th Round 9th Round 10th Round 11th Round
jun-97 Large 1 2 1
Medium 1 1
Small 1 2 9 4 10 10 2 2
jun-97 Large  1- R 1 - R
TBTF Medium 1 1
Small 1 2 9 4 4
dec-96 Large 1 2
Medium 1 1 2
Small 1 2 1 10 2 1 13 6
dec-96 Large  1 - R
TBTF Medium 1 1
Small 1 2 1 10 2 1
jun-96 Large 1 2 1
Medium 1 1
Small 5 9 6 13 6
jun-96 Large  1 - R
TBTF Medium
Small
dec-95 Large 1 1 1 1
Medium 1 1
Small 3 3 1 1 7 6 6 4 3 6
dec-95 Large  1 - R
TBTF Medium
Small
jun-95 Large 1 2 1
Medium 1
Small 1 3 2 12 8 10 2
jun-95 Large  1 - R 1 - R
TBTF Medium 1
Small 1 3 2 12 1  
Source : Own calculation 
Note : The table presents the number of banks failures for each round of contagion. Each row represents a different quarter. The columns 
represent the different rounds of contagion. The first round is constituted by the first domino. For each round, the table provides the 
number of large (>10% assets), medium-sized (> 3% of assets) and the small banks failing. The table is based on contagion exercises 
using the aggregate exposure technique to estimate the matrix of bilateral exposures. For each quarter, one row presents the results 
obtained with the basic model and one row presents the results obtained when we assume a TBTF. R stands for rescued. 51. 




Case of multiple 
failures triggered by a 
domestic bank 
Maximum number of 




Percentages of balance 
sheet assets affected 
(excluding assets of 
"first domino") 
Worst-case scenario 
Percentages of balance 
sheet assets affected 
(excluding assets of 
"first domino") 
Aggregate exposures - Belgium December 1998 (a) 
75  7  34  0.50%  56.00% 
50  2  21  14.49%  28.46% 
40  2  16  7.69%  14.87% 
25  1  2  0.50%  0.50% 
10  0  1  -  0.00% 
Upper and Worms (Germany) end December 1998 (b) 
75  N.A.  2444  0.85% (c)  76.30% 
50  N.A.  1740  0.66%(c)  61.60% 
40  N.A.  115  0.58%(c)  5.00% 
25  N.A.  31  0.3%(c)  0.75% 
10  N.A.  19  0.26%(c)  0.57% 
Aggregate exposures - Belgium December 2000(d) 
100  5  36  3.16%  61.92% 
80  5  21  3.10%  13.86% 
60  4  16  0.43%  11.64% 
40  4  4  0.40%  0.43% 
20  3  2  0.39%  0.39% 
Bank of England FSR at end 2000(e) 
100  4  N.A.  8.80%  25.20% 
80  4  N.A.  1.00%  6.70% 
60  3  N.A.  0.00%  6.70% 
40  2  N.A.  0.00%  0.00% 
20  0  N.A.  0.00%  0.00% 
Sources : Upper and Worms (2002), Wells (2002), NBB. 
 
Note : The table presents comparative contagion indicators for Belgium, the United Kingdom end Germany. Results are presented for 
several LGDs.  
Note that as the median is calculated on very few observations; it sometimes increases when LGD decreases. 
(a) Out of 80 cases 
(b) Out of 3246 banks 
(c) Average instead of median - not conditional on multiple failure 
(d) Out of 72 cases 
(e) Out of 33 possible cases 
 52. 
Chart 1 - Contagion effect - Worst case scenario and percentage of banks initiating contagion when 








































Source : own calculation 
Note: The graphs present the evolution of the worst case scenario and of the number of cases of contagion for 20 different LGDs 
over time. The results are based on contagion exercises using matrices of bilateral exposures estimated with the aggregate 
exposure technique. 
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